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Compulsory Joinder of Classes
Under Rule 19
Thomas D. Stoddardt
What happens when a procedural phantom1 meets a freak
from birth?2 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have adopted
both the rules of necessary parties (Rule 19(a)) and class actions
(Rule 23) from equity practice. Rule 19(a) requires the joinder of
persons whose absence creates a risk of an incomplete or unjust
judgment.' Rule 23 allows one or more members to represent an
entire class of individuals under certain circumstances.4 The inter-
t B.A. 1987, Swarthmore College; J.D. Candidate 1992, The University of Chicago.
1 The indispensable party. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Indispensable Party: The His-
torical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 Colum L Rev 1254, 1254 (1961); FRCP 19(b).
2 The class action. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: To-
ward a History of the Class Action, 77 Colum L Rev 866, 866 (1977). See also Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., Some Problems of Equity 200 (Michigan, 1950) ("The situation is so tangled
and bewildering that I sometimes wonder whether the world would be any the worse off if
the class-suit device had been left buried in the learned obscurity of Calvert on Parties to
Suit in Equity.").
3 FRCP 19(a) states:
(a) Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process
and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence com-
plete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of
the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the
person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined, the
court shall order that the person be made a party. If the person should join as a plain-
tiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an
involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and joinder of that party
would render the venue of the action improper, that party shall be dismissed from the
action.
4 FRCP 23 states:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common
to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative party will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
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play between these two monsters, however, remains unclear. Can a
class be a person necessary for a just adjudication of a dispute be-
tween litigants already before the court? At first glance the answer
is no. Rule 19(d), "Exception of Class Actions," states that the en-
tire Rule 19 is "subject to the provisions of Rule 23."5 A closer
look, however, reveals that Rule 19(d) is not an obstacle to the
joinder of a "necessary class."
Few courts have confronted this question head on. In Shimkus
v Gersten Companies,6 the Ninth Circuit rejected the position that
Rule 19(d) uniformly excludes classes from joinder. Instead, the
Ninth Circuit held that Rule 19(d) "allows joinder [of classes] to
the extent its use does not conflict with Rule 23's provisions.'"' In
contrast, several district courts have explicitly or implicitly inter-
preted Rule 19 to preclude the consideration of classes as neces-
sary parties.8 These courts apparently view Rule 19(d) as a bound-
ary dividing mutually exclusive mechanisms.
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corre-
sponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
5 FRCP 19(d).
6 816 F2d 1318 (9th Cir 1987).
7 Id at 1321 (emphasis in original). The court found joinder of non-African American
minorities desirable in this case, and remanded for a determination of which other minority
classes should be joined. Id at 1322. Although Shimkus and other courts employed the ap-
pellation "black" to refer to the racial group involved in the litigation, this Comment uses
more contemporary language.
8 See Thompson v Board of Educ. of Romeo Community Schools, 71 FRD 398, 412 (W
D Mich 1976) (stating that the party joinder rules "concern separate situations"), rev'd on
other grounds, 709 F2d 1200 (6th Cir 1983); LCC Corp. v PBGC, 94 FRD 15 (E D Mo 1980);
Hastings-Murtagh v Texas Air Corp., 119 FRD 450 (S D Fla 1988); Spirit v Teachers In-
surance and Annuity Association of America, 416 F Supp 1019 (S D NY 1976). See also
Jeffries v Georgia Residential Finance Authority, 678 F2d 919, 928-29 (11th Cir 1982) (class
1454 [58:1453
Compulsory Joinder
This Comment argues that allowing for the joinder of neces-
sary classes would facilitate the protection of third parties and the
efficient and equitable resolution of disputes. While the Rules al-
ready contemplate a number of ways in which the interests of such
third parties may be protected,9 these mechanisms are imperfect.
Joinder of necessary classes provides a critical layer of additional
protection.
Sections I and II of this Comment outline the nature of the
relationship between Rules 19 and 23 and discuss illustrative cases.
Section III argues that the history of, and the policies underlying,
the joinder rules support the idea that absent classes that satisfy
the standards of Rule 19 may be joined. Section IV discusses some
limitations on and possible objections to the necessary class. The
Comment concludes that Rule 19(d) is not a bar to the joinder of
necessary classes.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RULE 19 AND RULE 23
A. Overview of the Rules
Rule 19(a) provides for the joinder of necessary parties. Three
factors commonly determine whether a party is necessary under
Rule 19(a). A party is necessary if: (1) without her, the court can-
not grant complete relief to the original parties; (2) any relief
granted in her absence would expose the original parties to the risk
of multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations; or (3) the relief, if
granted, would impair the necessary party's own ability to defend a
related interest.10 The first situation rarely occurs.1" If a necessary
party is absent from a suit, the defendant can move under Rule
12(b)(7) to dismiss the claim. 12 The court also may raise the issue
of tenant plaintiffs sought to avoid joining class of landlords by relying on Rule 19(d) excep-
tion, but court did not reach the issue because absent landlords were not necessary to the
action).
9 Among the tools presently available to protect the interests of third parties are inter-
vention of right under Rule 24, notice requirements, consolidation of multiple actions, fair-
ness hearings before court approval of consent decrees, and narrowing the relief available to
plaintiffs.
10 FRCP 19(a).
11 See Richard D. Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure
Federal Rule 19, 60 NYU L Rev 1061, 1081 (1985).
11 FRCP 12(b) provides:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading... shall be asserted
in the responsive pleading thereto ... except that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion: ... (7) failure to join a party under Rule 19.
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on its own motion.13 If a necessary party cannot be joined, the
court may dismiss the action if it cannot proceed in good con-
science without him.14 While necessary parties are typically joined
as defendants, the court may also join them as involuntary
plaintiffs.15
Under Rule 23, class actions must meet four prerequisites: (1)
the members of the class are too numerous to join individually; (2)
there are questions of law or fact that are common to the class; (3)
the claims and defenses of the class representatives are typical of
those of the entire class; and (4) the class representatives can fairly
represent the entire class.16 Furthermore, Rule 23(b) requires a
class to qualify as one of three types: (1) a mandatory class; (2) a
class seeking injunctive relief; or (3) a class where common ques-
tions of law or fact predominate.' Plaintiffs as a class may join
together or a plaintiff may sue defendants as a class.' 8
B. A Triangular Lawsuit
The problem of the necessary class typically arises when a
plaintiff, P, commences suit against a defendant, D, seeking a rem-
edy that may conflict with the interests of C, a large number of
absentees who are unaware of the action or who are too unsophisti-
cated to intervene.' 9 C's interests are often best served when the
13 FRCP 21; Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing. Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amend-
ments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv L Rev 356, 374 (1967). See
Provident Tradesmens Bank v Patterson, 390 US 102, 111 (1968).
14 FRCP 19(b) states:
Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible. If a person as described in
subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether
in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or
should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The fac-
tors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in
the person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; sec-
ond, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of
relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plain-
tiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.




18 See FRCP 23(a).
19 This Comment will only address a few examples, but there are many situations that
fit this pattern. For illustrations, see cases cited in Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees With-
out Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third Parties, 1987 U Chi Legal F 103; LCC
Corp., 94 FRD 15 (class of former plan participants not necessary to an action for declara-
tory judgment by the plan administrator seeking residual assets); Hastings-Murtagh, 119
1456 [58:1453
Compulsory Joinder
relief available to P and the outcomes available to D are both lim-
ited. Since C desires an outcome different from that sought by P or
D, it is incorrect to assume that either P or D will adequately
represent C's interests..0
This paradigmatic triangle of interests most often occurs when
the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief.21 Injunctive relief often im-
poses new standards of conduct on the parties involved in a law-
suit. These new standards may also affect the interests of other
groups not party to the suit, and may, in fact, impair their legal
rights. For instance, a civil rights injunction calling for a prefer-
ence for a particular minority group may reduce the number of op-
portunities available to other minority groups.22 Alternatively, such
a plan may be too ambitious and result in "reverse" discrimination
against an unrepresented majority.23 These risks raise questions
about the proper interpretation of consent decrees, 2 4 the legal con-
sequences of a failure to intervene,25 and the propriety of granting
the requested relief. As we shall see, the necessary class concept
offers a partial solution to some of these difficulties.
FRD 450 (proposed class of employee-shareholders could not sue the corporation to rescind
a merger detrimental to their interests as employees without joining the corporation's non-
employee shareholders); Spirit, 416 F Supp at 1023 (male employees not necessary to a suit
by a class of female employees against the administrator of a pension plan); English v Sea-
board Coast Line Railroad Co., 465 F2d 43, 47 (5th Cir 1972) (class of white employees or a
representative should be joined to an action by African American employees filed against
their common employer).
20 To be sure, under Rule 19(a), C would be joined either as a defendant or as an invol-
untary plaintiff. But this is better than the alternative because neither P nor D represents
C's interests sufficiently to justify ignoring C altogether. FRCP 19(a). See also Comment,
Defendant Class Actions: The Failure of Rule 23 and a Proposed Solution, 38 UCLA L Rev
223, 264-74 (1990) (proposing to allow defendants to join together on their own initiative,
thereby solving a problem partly analogous to the situation considered here).
21 Professor Freer asserts that the need for an aggressive Rule 19 is strongest in situa-
tions where a defendant may be subject to conflicting obligations. See Freer, 60 NYU L Rev
at 1090, 1094-96 (cited in note 11). Civil rights class actions are one illustration. See Advi-
sory Committee's Notes on the 1966 Amendment to Rule 23(b)(2).
2 See Shimkus, 816 F2d at 1320.
'3 See, for example, Martin v Wilks, 490 US 755 (1989) (white firefighters challenged
consent decree reached without their participation on the basis that it resulted in discrimi-
nation against them).
24 Compare Laycock, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 121-24 (cited in note 19) (advocating an
increased reliance on Rule 19 to protect third parties, even to the extent of joining absent
classes), with Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 Mich L
Rev 321, 335-38 (1988) (eriticizing Laycock and proposing instead that interested third par-
ties should be permitted to enter negotiations through consolidation).
15 See Martin, 490 US at 765 (failure of white firefighters to intervene in suit by Afri-
can-American firefighters did not raise "impermissible collateral attack" doctrine when the
former later challenged a court-approved affirmative action plan).
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Similar problems arise where the requested relief is money
damages. First, like injunctions, money judgments may impose new
standards of conduct upon the parties. 26 Second, a money judg-
ment awarded to one person may expose the defendant to inconsis-
tent obligations when that defendant is subsequently sued by
others.27 Courts try to avoid these problems by joining union repre-
sentatives, government officers, and other proxies who resemble
class representatives (as defined by Rule 23) and who serve a simi-
lar function.28 It is only where there is no obvious representative
for a group of numerous absentees that we stumble onto a poten-
tial lacuna in the rules.
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF NECESSARY CLASSES
The cases addressing the legitimacy of necessary classes focus
on the proper significance to be accorded to section (d) of Rule
19.29 Section (d) provides that Rule 19 is "subject to the provisions
of Rule 23." The courts are split, however, on whether Rule 19(d)
precludes the use of Rule 19 in class actions under Rule 23. Some
courts have suggested that the explicit language of section (d) es-
tablishes that Rules 19 and 23 are only to operate in mutually ex-
clusive situations.30 For example, one court has concluded that the
rules concern "separate situations and each has its own require-
ments for each situation."'31 Other courts interpret the language of
section (d) more broadly and hold that Rules 19 and 23 can oper-
ate together where they seem to overlap. 2
26 See Freer, 60 NYU L Rev at 1089-93 (cited in note 11).
27 Id.
" See Shimkus, 816 F2d 1318; Thompson, 71 FRD 398; Pentland v Dravo Corp., 152
F2d 851 (3d Cir 1945); Alabama v Blue Bird Body Co., 71 FRD 183 (D Ala 1976). See
generally Stephen C. Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern Class Action
18-20, 226-28 (Yale, 1987).
29 In dicta, the Supreme Court has suggested that Rule 19(d) allows joinder of an ab-
sent class, but the context is too weak to justify a strong inference either way. In Illinois
Brick Co. v Illinois, 431 US 720 (1977), an antitrust suit, the Court dismissed the claims bf
all but those plaintiffs who had purchased directly from the manufacturer, but stated that:
Where, as would often be the case, the potential number of claimants at a particular
level of distribution are so numerous that joinder of all is impracticable, a representa-
tive presumably would have to be found to bring them into the action as a class.
Id at 739 (citing FRCP 19(d)).
Only the Shimkus court has referred explicitly to Rule 19(d) when compelling joinder
of a class under Rule 19. Shimkus, 816 F2d at 1321. But see Blue Bird Body Co., 71 FRD at
187 (relying on Rule 19 to justify the standing of a class representative).
20 Thompson, 71 FRD 398.
31 Id at 412.
"2 Shimkus, 816 F2d 1318; Blue Bird Body Co., 71 FRD 183; English, 465 F2d 43.
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The Rules Advisory Committee added section (d) to Rule 19
in 1966 as part of its sweeping revision of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure governing necessary parties, intervention, and
class actions." The Advisory Committee sought not only to correct
technical difficulties in the language and application of the rules,
but also to impress upon the rules a more practical, policy-driven
approach.34 Before 1966, the interplay between Rule 19 and Rule
23 was treated entirely in a prefatory phrase conditioning the first
sentence of Rule 19(a).3 5 The Advisory Committee offered no ex-
planation for giving this caveat its own section." However, by ad-
ding section (d) and giving it the subheading, "Exception of Class
Actions," the drafters seemed to suggest that Rules 19 and 23 were
to govern mutually exclusive situations.
The court in Thompson v Board of Education of Romeo Com-
munity Schools,3 7 a class action against several school boards, took
this position. Although Thompson concerned the scope of permis-
sive joinder under Rule 20,38 the court relied on Rule 19(d) to sup-
port its analysis.3 9 The Thompson court focused on the explicit
language of the caption, "Exception of Class Actions." Specifically,
the court asserted that the caption expressly established that Rule
19 is displaced by Rule 23 in the context of class actions.4 ° The
court then argued that permissive joinder under Rule 20 was also
precluded by Rule 23, even though Rule 20 did not expressly es-
tablish as much. The court concluded that "Rule 20 and Rule 23
concern separate situations and each has its own requirements for
33 See Kaplan, 81 Harv L Rev at 356 (cited in note 13). See also Sherman L. Cohn, The
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 Georgetown L J 1204, 1204 (1966).
31 Kaplan, 81 Harv L Rev at 365 n 34 (cited in note 13) ("Thoughtful judges, following
the older equity tradition, have indeed often considered the question of joinder to be 'en-
tirely practical'. ").
35 Before the 1966 amendments, FRCP 19(a) stated:
(a) Necessary Joinder. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23 and of subdivision (b) of
this rule, persons having a joint interest shall be made parties and be joined on the
same side as plaintiffs or defendants. When a person who should join as a plaintiff
refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant or, in proper cases, an involuntary
plaintiff.
See Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District
Courts, 39 FRD 69, 87 (1966).
36 The Advisory Committee Note to FRCP 19(d) simply says that "[S]ubdivision (d)
repeats the exception contained in the first clause of the predecessor subdivision (a)." See
Proposed Amendments, 39 FRD at 94.
37 71 FRD 398 (W D Mich 1976).
33 Rule 20 defines the boundaries of permissible joinder by specifying who may be a
proper party.
39 Thompson, 71 FRD at 412.
40 Id.
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each situation." By basing its conclusions about Rule 20 on infer-
ences drawn from Rule 19(d), the court implicitly assumed that
Rule 19(d) is an even stronger example of a case where the Rules
contemplate separate situations and do not interact.
In part, Thompson manifests the courts' general hesitation to
adapt the geometry of litigation to meet the needs of absentees. 41
This hesitation is based generally on the belief that the interests of
absentee classes are either (1) insubstantial, (2) adequately repre-
sented by the litigants already before the court, or (3) sufficiently
protected by the opportunity to intervene on their own initiative.42
Even where compulsory joinder of an interested class is feasible,
some courts have found a "public rights exception." This exception
allows the court to deny the joinder of private third parties as nec-
essary in suits by plaintiffs seeking to vindicate public rights.43
41 See, for example, LCC Corp., 94 FRD at 17 (a class of former plan participants not
necessary to an action for declaratory judgment by the plan administrator seeking residual
assets); Hastings-Murtagh, 119 FRD at 458 (proposed class of employee-shareholders could
not sue the corporation to rescind a merger detrimental to their interests as employees with-
out joining the corporation's non-employee shareholders).
42 See, for example, Eldredge v Carpenters 46, 440 F Supp 506, 527 (N D Cal 1977)
(order compelling joinder of numerous indispensable absentees), later proceeding, 83 FRD
136 (N D Cal 1979) (dismissing action because plaintiff failed to adequately join indispensa-
ble parties), rev'd, 662 F2d 534, 538 (9th Cir 1981) (absentees not indispensable); Pentland,
152 F2d at 856 (availability of intervention under Rule 24(a)); Mikulay Co. v Urban Mass
Transportation Society, 90 FRD 250 (D DC 1980) (federal agency defendants would protect
interest of absent city); Jeffries, 678 F2d 919 (absentee landlord lacked sufficient interest);
Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v Hodel, 802 F2d 466, 469 (9th Cir 1986) (miners lacked
sufficient legal entitlement in regulatory procedures); Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v
Warner, 665 F Supp 1549 (Fla 1987) (employees not indispensable to action by customer
against firm because interest insubstantial and defended by firm).
In Eldredge, two female apprentice carpenters brought sex discrimination claims
against the Joint Apprenticeship Training Committee (JATC). The district court found that
the JATC did not represent the 4,500 employers and 60 unions, and that these absentees
had a significant interest in the controversy because a judgment against the JATC would
directly increase their hiring costs. Eldredge, 440 F Supp at 523. As the court stated:
The only alternatives appear to be certification of defendant classes or joinder of con-
tractor associations in lieu of individual employer members .... That either of these
alternatives can provide a feasible and adequate solution to the problems raised ... is
open to serious question. The former would raise a host of questions under Rule 23,
while the latter would raise further questions under Rule 19 as to whether individual
employers and union locals remain indispensable parties despite the joinder of their
representatives.
Id at 526-27.
Eldredge is unlike most Rule 19(b) cases, in that incomplete diversity of citizenship is
usually what makes joinder impractical or impossible. See note 90.
4 The public rights exception states that when a party seeks to vindicate public rights
(protection of the environment, for example) by suing a government agency, persons with
private rights (polluters) affected by the disposition of the case are not necessary to the
action. See National Licorice v NLRB, 309 US 350, 363 (1940); Jeffries v Georgia Residen-
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Nevertheless, in Shimkus v Gersten Companies,44 the Ninth
Circuit adopted the position that Rules 19 and 23 can work to-
gether and ordered the joinder of a necessary class. In the underly-
ing litigation, Shimkus filed a civil rights class action on behalf of a
group of African-Americans, charging that the defendant had spe-
cifically discriminated against them. A week later, the government
filed suit against the defendants, charging them with housing dis-
crimination against all minorities. The court in the government
case entered a consent decree enjoining Gersten from discriminat-
ing against any minority. Eighteen months later, in the Shimkus
case, the court entered a consent decree requiring Gersten to im-
plement an affirmative action program specifically for African-
Americans. The Ninth Circuit held that the approval of the second
settlement, which preferred African-Americans to the detriment of
other minorities, was an abuse of discretion if rendered in the ab-
sence of the necessary class of non-African-American minorities.45
This result required the court to accept some interplay between
Rule 19 and Rule 23. The court held that "Rule 19(d) simply re-
quires us to respect the language of Rule 23, but allows joinder to
the extent its use does not conflict with Rule 23's provisions.' 46
The court justified this interpretation of Rule 19(d) by focusing on
the language of that section as it existed prior to its separation
from 19(a) in 1966, rather than placing undue emphasis on the
caption, "Exception of Class Actions."
The division in the courts over the legitimacy of necessary
classes turns on how the courts read Rule 19(d). If Thompson is
correct in its assumption that the language of the caption to Rule
19(d) controls, then courts would be mistaken to consider classes
as "persons" necessary for a just adjudication. If, on the other
hand, the language of the caption is not decisive, then the result in
Shimkus is a legitimate resolution of the difficulties that arise
when absentees are too numerous to join as individuals. Although
Rule 19(d) is not so clear as to preclude either interpretation, Sec-
tion III demonstrates that the interpretation adopted in Shimkus
tial Finance Authority, 678 F2d 919, 929 (11th Cir 1982); National Resources Defense
Council v Berklund, 458 F Supp 925, 933 (D DC 1978); Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public
Rights Exception to Party Joinder, 65 NC L Rev 745, 765-69 (1987) (arguing that the
courts have unjustifiably ignored Rule 19 in creating this exception).
44 816 F2d 1318 (9th Cir 1987).
45 Id at 1320.
41 Id at 1321 (emphasis in original). Specifically, the court's emphasis on Rule 23's
"provisions" suggests that the court looked beyond the word "exception" in the Rule's cap-
tion to the actual language of the rule.
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is both plausible and preferable in light of the policies underlying
both Rules 19 and 23, their common history, and the inadequacies
of the alternatives.
III. HISTORICAL AND POLICY ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING
RECOGNITION OF THE NECESSARY CLASS
Rule 19(d) does not compel the conclusion that Rules 19 and
23 are mutually exclusive; that is, it does not declare that a class
cannot be a person necessary for just adjudication. In fact, the lan-
guage of section (d), when read in conjunction with the other
Rules, suggests that section (d) simply obviates the need to join all
class members once an adequate representative can be joined.
Without the exception provided by Rule 19(d), a single defendant
sued by a plaintiff class could move to require the joinder of all
absent class members.47
The better reading of Rule 19(d) is that once an adequate rep-
resentative has been joined, Rule 23 makes it unnecessary to join
those already represented even if they would otherwise be neces-
sary under Rule 19(a). This is what is meant by Rule 19(d)'s re-
quirement that the rest of the rule be applied "subject to the pro-
visions of Rule 23. , ,48 A necessary class, then, is simply one that
meets both the requirements of Rule 23 (a class) and Rule 19 (nec-
essary to litigation).
The following three sections support this interpretation of
Rule 19(d) by examining the historical development of the party
joinder rules, their purposes, and the effectiveness of the available
alternatives to the necessary class concept. The analysis which fol-
lows also provides some basis for appraising the scope and utility
of necessary classes relative to other joinder mechanisms.
A. The Historical Context
The class action and the necessary parties rule share a com-
mon history in the courts of equity. This history clarifies the rea-
sons for the adoption of Rule 19(d) in 1966 and sheds light on the
proper interaction of Rules 19 and 23 today.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the English
courts of equity developed fairly workable necessary party rules.
These rules arose in equity because Chancery afforded a greater
47 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, 7 Federal Practice and




opportunity for party joinder than did courts of law, in the interest
of achieving "complete justice. '4 This emphasis on a flexible and
pragmatic approach to joinder in equity is a useful background for
thinking about necessary classes and Rule 19(d) today. Professor
Hazard summarized the English rules as follows:
1. All persons who are interested in a controversy are nec-
essary parties to a suit involving that controversy, so that a
complete disposition of the dispute may be made.
2. Joinder of necessary parties is excused when it is im-
possible, impractical, or involves undue complications.
3. A person who is not a party, unless represented by one
who is a party, is not bound by a decree.50
These rules migrated to the American courts, became codified
in the early state rules of procedure,51 and, with some changes,
were embodied in Rule 19(a). In addition, the notion that some
parties were "indispensable" and that a court should dismiss the
action if it could not join them also developed in the late eight-
eenth century in England and the early nineteenth century in
America.52 This concept survives today in Rule 19(b). ss
These necessary party rules ultimately proved unsatisfactory,
however, in cases with large numbers of such parties; the rise of
such cases in the nineteenth century threatened the usefulness of
the rules. These problems are illustrated by a passage from the Su-
preme Court's 1853 decision in Smith v Swormstedt:54
" Hazard, 61 Colum L Rev at 1268-75 (cited in note 1). For the development of the
necessary party rules in the United States, see generally John W. Reed, Compulsory Join-
der of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 Mich L Rev 327 (1957); Robert G. Bone, Mapping the
Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to
the Federal Rules, 89 Colum L Rev 1 (1989). The Hazard article strongly influenced the
drafters of the 1966 Amendments to Rule 19. See Proposed Amendments, 39 FRD at 90.
80 Hazard, 61 Colum L Rev at 1255 (cited in note 1).
51 See, for example, An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and Pro-
ceedings of the Courts of this State (Code of Procedure), 1848 NY Laws 487, 497, 516. This
Act, known as the Field Code, was a forerunner of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
51 See Shields v Barrow, 58 US (17 How) 130, 139 (1855) (the decision whether or not
to proceed without non-diverse co-debtors turns on the question of whether their interest
was "separable"). Later courts cited Shields's labelistic analysis of the necessary-indispensa-
ble doctrine with a myopic focus on the nature of the rights asserted rather than the practi-
cal considerations of individual cases. See Reed, 55 Mich L Rev at 355 (cited in note 49);
Kaplan, 81 Harv L Rev at 359-62 (cited in note 13). But see Bone, 89 Colum L Rev at 65 n
198 (cited in note 49) (sharply disagreeing with Hazard's account and attributing tensions in
compulsory joinder to "deep-seated normative conflict, not doctrinal error").
'3 The 1966 revision of Rule 19(b) transformed the indispensable party concept into a
more flexible notion and undid some of the legalism of earlier interpretations. See Provident
Bank, 390 US at 124-25. See also Kaplan, 81 Harv L Rev at 362-66 (cited in note 13).
" 57 US (16 How) 288 (1853).
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There are some fifteen hundred persons represented by the
complainants, and over double that number by the defen-
dants. It is manifest that to require all the parties to be
brought upon the record, as is required in a suit at law [per
the necessary parties rules], would amount to a denial of jus-
tice. The right might be defeated by objections to parties,
from the difficulty of ascertaining them, or if ascertained,
from the changes constantly occurring by death or
otherwise. 5
These practical difficulties led the courts of equity to adopt the
class suit in which one member of a class was permitted "to 'stand
for' all the class members for purposes of the necessary parties
rule. This meant that the action could go forward without individ-
ual joinder of all members of the group." 56 The class suit was the
forerunner of the modern class action.57
Thus class actions, embodied in Rule 23, arose out of the his-
torical need to circumvent the completeness requirement of the
necessary parties rules, embodied in Rule 19. Read together in this
light, Rule 19(d) can be seen as simply codifying that historical
relationship. Section (d), then, relaxes Rule 19 joinder require-
ments for class members once the requirements of Rule 23 are sat-
isfied and an adequate representative is joined.5 8 Rule 19(d) sim-
ply prevents a party from moving to compel the joinder of all class
members in addition to their representative.
B. The Policies Underlying the Party Joinder Rules
The necessary class concept produced by the close relationship
between Rule 19 and Rule 23 also finds support in the common
55 Id at 303.
56 Fleming James, Jr. and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Civil Procedure § 10.21 at 563 (Lit-
tle, Brown, 3d ed 1985). See also Chafee, Some Problems of Equity at 203-13 (cited in note
2); Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226 US 659 (1912) (Rule
38, originally adopted by the Supreme Court in 1842, provided that "[w]hen the question is
one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to
make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for
the whole.").
N, The class action also has origins in the multiplicity of suits doctrine which enabled
equity courts to obtain jurisdiction over a number of separate actions when there was no
other basis for jurisdiction. See Bone, 89 Colum L Rev at 29 (cited in note 49). See generally
Chafee, Some Problems of Equity at 156-58 (cited in note 2).
58 See General Telephone Co. v Falcon, 457 US 147, 155 (1982) (recognizing the class
action as an "exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the
individual named parties only").
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purposes of the two rules. Rule 19 joinder serves four policy goals:
(1) minimizing duplicative litigation; (2) protecting the interests of
absentees; (3) protecting certain defendants; and (4) preserving ju-
dicial efficiency and integrity.59 Importantly, Rule 23 furthers the
same policies. The class action furthers the first two policies cited
above by involving those persons most likely to suffer some impair-
ment of interest as a result of the litigation. This involvement con-
serves judicial resources and minimizes the risk of trampling upon
the interests of absentees by granting a remedy that, although not
legally binding on the absentees, disposes of the matter for all
practical purposes.6 0
Rule 23 also serves the third and fourth policy goals by reduc-
ing the incidence of multiple, inconsistent obligations arising from
separate judgments against the defendant. In Shimkus, for exam-
ple, the housing preferences secured by the African-American class
conflicted with the decree already entered on behalf of the non-
African-American minority classes. The non-African-American mi-
norities were now doubly disadvantaged by the special treatment
afforded the African-Americans in the competition for housing."1
Not only did this burden the defendant with the additional suits,
but it raised the specter of even more litigation to untangle poten-
tially incompatible judgments. This additional litigation would not
only be expensive, but the appearance of schizophrenia and caprice
would demean the law in the eyes of the public.2
C. The Inadequacy of Alternative Solutions
A number of other procedural solutions exist to protect absen-
tee parties. Of these, intervention of right under Rule 24 is the
most effective such mechanism. The other alternatives include
shaping the relief available to the plaintiff to protect the absen-
" See Freer, 60 NYU L Rev at 1079 (cited in note 11). See generally John C. McCoid,
A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 Stan L Rev 707, 707 (1976); Richard D.
Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the Court's
Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U Pitt L Rev 809, 813 (1989).
so This emphasis on practical effects, rather than purely legal consequences (res judi-
cata), is an innovation of the 1966 amendments. This emphasis is also reflected in the
changes to Rules 19(b) and 24(a). See Kaplan, 81 Harv L Rev at 365, 402, 405 (cited in note
13).
" 816 F2d at 1321.
62 See McCoid, 28 Stan L Rev at 707 (cited in note 59) ("The specter of public dismay
over a system that decides like cases differently is a disturbing one.").
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tees,6 3 holding fairness hearings as a prerequisite to the approval of
consent decrees, 4 consolidating multiple actions,6 5 requiring that
absentees be given notice,66 allowing collateral attack by the absen-
tee class, 67 or simply ignoring the absentee class interests.68 Each
of these provisions, however, leaves third parties wholly or partly
unprotected. Allowing joinder of necessary classes would provide
this lacking protection.
Intervention, particularly if combined with some type of no-
tice provision, offers some advantages over necessary classes.
Above all, intervention does not require joinder. Rather, it encour-
ages the absentee to join a suit only when the absentee thinks it
worth the effort.69 In this respect, intervenors are self-regulating
and require no procedural hammers or judicial involvement to en-
sure their participation. Joinder of parties under Rule 19, on the
other hand, must be initiated by the plaintiffs or defendants.
Moreover, because the intervenor's effort to participate indicates a
powerful interest in the case, the standard for asserting a signifi-
cant interest under Rule 24(a), while technically the same as the
standard under Rule 19(a),7 0 may be weaker.71 In fact, it is com-
03 See FRCP 19(b).
See Laycock, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 121-24 (cited in note 19).
65 See 28 USC §§ 1406-1407 (1990). Section 1406 provides that "in the interests of jus-
tice," a district court can transfer a case in which venue is improper to a district in which
the case could have been brought. Section 1407 establishes a procedure for multi-district
litigation. See also, Kramer, 87 Mich L Rev at 335-38 (cited in note 24) (arguing that trans-
fer and consolidation under Rule 42 is preferable to Rule 19 joinder of absentees potentially
affected by a consent decree).
06 This might be accomplished either under FRCP 23(d), "for the fair conduct of the
action," or possibly by amending the provisions of FRCP 19(c).
67 See, for example, Martin v Wilks, 490 US 755, 762-63 (1989).
68 See generally Laycock, 1987 U Chi Legal F at 130-31 (cited in note 19) (though con-
sent decree between litigants may require joinder of absentees under Rule 19, "[t]he rule
appears to be more ignored than followed"); Kramer, 87 Mich L Rev at 342 (cited in note
24) (even where absent third parties not denied due process, courts have sometimes treated
them "unfairly").
69 See Freer, 60 NYU L Rev at 1086 (cited in note 11).
70 Compare FRCP 24(a)(2) (allowing intervention "when the applicant claims an inter-
est relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the appli-
cant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is ade-
quately represented by existing parties"), with FRCP 19(a)(2) (requiring joinder unless "the
person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or
impede the person's ability to protect that interest .... ).
71 Nuesse v Camp, 385 F2d 694, 700 (DC Cir 1967); James and Hazard, Civil Procedure
§ 10.17 at 553 (cited in note 56).
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mon practice to allow both intervention of right and permissive in-
tervention of classes. 72
However, intervention does not always support the four policy
goals of Rule 19. Rule 24 does not swallow Rule 19. The fact that
the Federal Rules separately provide for intervention and neces-
sary parties suggests that Rule 19 handles cases that Rule 24 does
not. There are situations, for example, in which the interest in
joining the absentees is sufficiently compelling to draw them into
the litigation even if they do not wish to join. Also, absentees may
be unsophisticated or otherwise unaware of the original litigation.
Moreover, even if they do appreciate the threat, they may not be
in a position to defend their interests adequately.73
Because intervention relies on action by the absent parties,
the interests of both the court and the defendant are jeopardized
as well. Members of the absent class can sue later, seeking relief
contrary to that awarded in the first action.74 This potential for
incompatible obligations increases the likelihood that future litiga-
tion will be necessary to reconcile the competing judgments. It also
risks putting the defendant in the unfortunate position of trying to
satisfy inconsistent obligations. Thus, even if intervention and no-
tice are sufficient to protect absentees, the court's and the defend-
ant's interests7 5 should still lean in favor of allowing joinder of nec-
essary classes.
IV. THE SCOPE AND UTILITY OF THE NECESSARY CLASS
The concept of the necessary class, as demonstrated above, is
supported both by the history of Rules 19 and 23, and by their
common policy goals. Still, questions remain concerning its imple-
mentation in actual practice and its utility in comparison with
other possible alternatives. Necessary classes, for example, may
compromise the settlement options available to the original liti-
gants.76 They raise questions of who ought to identify absent par-
71 See, for example, Jansen v City of Cincinnati, 904 F2d 336, 344 (6th Cir 1990) (class
of African-American applicants permitted to intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)
in a civil rights action filed by white applicants). See also Payne v Weirton Steel Co., 397 F
Supp 192, 196 (N D W Va 1975) (class of women employees permitted to intervene under
Rule 24(b) and join plaintiffs' class in discrimination suit against employer).
73 McCoid, 28 Stan L Rev at 714 (cited in note 59). Adding a notice requirement to
Rule 19(c) might alleviate the problems that result from the absentees' lack of awareness,
but it would not overcome their inability to act.
74 See, for example, LCC Corp. v PBGC, 94 FRD 15, 17 (E D Mo 1980).
71 See Freer, 60 NYU L Rev at 1094-95 (cited in note 11).
76 Defendant class actions provide a useful comparison. In a defendant class action, a
plaintiff seeks resolution of claims against a large number of defendants by naming a mem-
ber of the defendant class as a representative of all defendants. Like the necessary class
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ties, who ought to pay for notice to such parties, and who ought to
represent them.77 Moreover, necessary classes impose more bur-
dens on an already overburdened judiciary. This section examines
these difficulties, which judges should recognize as limits on the
utility of necessary classes. It then focuses on the three types of
class actions authorized in Rule 23 in an effort to discern the scope
of necessary classes.
A. Difficulties with the Rule 19 Solution
Rule 19 is not without its own practical difficulties and is not a
panacea for situations inadequately addressed by other alterna-
tives. The provisions adopted by the Federal Rules to effect join-
der are inadequate to attain fully the purposes underlying joinder.
Allowing necessary classes may also encourage inefficient strategic
behavior by defendants. Courts should be advised of the availabil-
ity of the necessary class device, but should also be aware of these
difficulties.
Though joinder of necessary parties is desirable, the mecha-
nisms"' adopted by the Federal Rules to achieve it are sometimes
ineffective.79 Rule 19(c), for example, requires that the plaintiff
join all necessary parties or state their names in the pleading along
device, defendant class actions impose additional burdens on an unwilling group, namely the
defendant. The necessary class is also somewhat different, however, in that all of its mem-
bers are absent from the original litigation. This complete absence makes it more difficult to
recognize that the class exists at all, and exacerbates the problems of the unwilling class
representative. Necessary classes, unlike defendant class actions, also raise questions of who
should bear the costs of notifying and representing these additional litigants, and constrain
the original litigants' interests in resolving their bilateral conflict quickly and economically.
See generally Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91 Harv L Rev 630 (1978); Note, Certification
of Defendant Classes Under Rule 23(b)(2), 84 Colum L Rev 1371 (1984); Note, Defendant
Class Certification: The Difficulties Under Rule 23(b)(2) and the Rule 65(d) Solution, 8
NIU L Rev 143 (1987); Comment, 38 UCLA L Rev 223 (cited in note 20); Herbert B. New-
berg, 1 Newberg on Class Actions §§ 4.45-4.70 at 373-421 (McGraw-Hill, 2d ed 1985).
7 If the absent class is necessary and ought to be joined as a defendant, the court
should be able to manage the adequacy of representation by (1) not allowing the action to
proceed without the class, and (2) not allowing it to proceed as a class action unless the
plaintiff joins an adequate representative from the necessary class. See FRCP 23(d); New-
berg, 1 Newberg on Class Actions § 4.58 at 399 (cited in note 76) (discussing the court's
ability to impose conditions on class actions to ensure that the plaintiff does not select a
weak representative for a defendant class).
78 These are the pleading requirements of FRCP 19(c), the defendant's motion to dis-
miss under FRCP 12(b)(7), and the court's motion to dismiss sua sponte. See Kaplan, 81
Harv L Rev at 374 (cited in note 13).
7' Freer, 60 NYU L Rev at 1082 (cited in note 11); McCoid, 28 Stan L Rev at 75 (cited
in note 59).
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with reasons for nonjoinderY' However, unless the plaintiff and his
counsel seek to represent a plaintiff class, or seek to sue a vulnera-
ble defendant class, they have no incentive to complicate the litiga-
tion and frustrate their own potential for success by joining other
interested parties. 1
A more important enforcement mechanism is Rule 12(b)(7),
which provides for dismissal for failure to join a Rule 19 party.
Unfortunately, this mechanism is too often ineffective.8 2 Defen-
dants are unlikely to invite hostile classes into the litigation (which
is akin to awakening a sleeping giant), thereby multiplying their
potential liability, unless they face an almost certain risk of immi-
nent conflicting obligations and cannot interplead the potential
claimants."3 Similarly, it is not clear that the defendant would wish
to risk attracting the attention of the currently sleeping class by
making a Rule 12(b)(7) motion to dismiss. A court may also raise
the issue of absent but necessary parties on its own motion, but
courts do so infrequently.8 4 Moreover, since misjoinder is a proce-
dural policy issue and not a jurisdictional defect, a judgment ren-
dered in a necessary party's absence is not open to collateral attack
in a subsequent action by that party.8 5
These criticisms, of course, apply to the general ineffectiveness
of Rule 19 in joining necessary parties, not solely to its ineffective-
ness in the class action context. Although this Comment does not
30 FRCP 19(c) provides: "A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall state the names, if
known to the pleader, of any [necessary persons] who are not joined, and the reasons why
they are not joined."
s See James and Hazard, Civil Procedure § 10.12 at 535-38 (cited in note 56).
' Freer, 60 NYU L Rev at 1079-80 (cited in note 11) (because, as a practical matter,
Rule 19 nonjoinder is only invoked by the defendant, the absentee and society's interests
are subject to his litigation strategy).
63 Id.
" See McCoid, 28 Stan L Rev at 727-28 n 129 (cited in note 59) (judges should seek to
join claims in a single "package" more frequently). But see Freer, 60 NYU L Rev at 1079 n
96 (cited in note 11) (judges are in a poor position to raise the issue, especially given general
disuse of Rule 19(c)).
85 See Provident Bank, 390 US at 116 (Since Rule 19(b) is based on policy considera-
tions such as the efficiency of resolving claims in a single proceeding, misjoinder is less prob-
lematic at later stages of the litigation: "By the time the case reached the Court of Appeals,
however, the problematic preference on efficiency grounds had entirely disappeared: there
was no reason then to throw away a valid judgment just because it did not theoretically
settle the whole controversy."). The earlier judgment is not legally binding against the ab-
sentee in a subsequent action, but it may be preclusive in a practical sense. See also Kaplan,
81 Harv L Rev at 366 (cited in note 13) ("disappearance of the bugaboo of jurisdiction");
Wright, Miller and Kane, 7 Federal Practice and Procedure § 1611 at 178 (cited in note 47)
("not subject to collateral attack in a subsequent action since . . . the defect is not
jurisdictional").
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attempt to rectify all of the problems associated with Rule 19, the
above discussion does raise an important issue specific to the nec-
essary class context. An expansive interpretation of the existing
rules would go a long way to solving this one specific problem.
Joinder of necessary parties requires the judiciary to take an
active role in protecting absent claimants and the public. Judges
must be attentive to those cases where the class of absentees pos-
sesses an interest subject to substantial impairment under Rule
19(a) (2) (i). In the class action context, the necessity of an alert ju-
diciary is even greater. The class action is quite commonly used in
areas like civil rights or environmental litigation in which the ab-
sentees' lack of sophistication and their inability to afford legal
counsel" may have prevented their intervention in the first place.
Courts should also be aware that defendants might find the
necessary class a potent weapon against plaintiffs. Defendants
have the greatest incentive to raise the issue of absent classes when
the absent class would be certified as a codefendant. Because the
claimants would bear the initial burden of notice costs,8 7 the join-
der of a new defendant class may deter litigation of the claims.,
More importantly, the additional defendant class probably will
provide litigation support to the defendants and offer little in the
way of potential relief for the plaintiff."s Thus, allowing joinder of
a necessary class in some instances may perversely increase the in-
cidence of strategic behavior.9 0
In summary, Rule 19(d) does not preclude joinder of a neces-
sary class, but use of a necessary class does raise some practical
considerations. Judges must be aware of those circumstances in
86 The absentees may not be able to afford legal representation for a variety of reasons:
they may be poor; their prospects of prevailing may be speculative; or the value of the re-
quested relief-usually an injunction-may be low.
" Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 US 156, 178 (1974); Meadows v Ford Motor Co., 62
FRD 98, 101-02 (W D Ky 1973).
Compare Note, 91 Harv L Rev at 647-50 (cited in note 76).
89 A successful judgment against a class of impecunious defendants may not be worth
the effort required to collect it.
10 The fact that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction may offset the potential
harm to the plaintiff. In Strawbridge v Curtiss, 7 US (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), the Supreme
Court held that federal courts obtain diversity jurisdiction over a case only if all parties to
the action are diverse. As a result, if a defendant can identify a necessary party who is non-
diverse, he can compel joinder of that party and force the case into state court. Allowing
joinder of necessary classes may provide a solution to this difficulty. Under Supreme Tribe
of Ben-Hur v Cauble, 266 US 356, 367 (1921), only the class representative must be diverse.
Therefore, if the plaintiff can locate a person in the same situation as the non-diverse neces-
sary party, but who is diverse, the plaintiff can join the necessary individuals as a class with
the diverse person as the class representative, and retain the court's diversity jurisdiction.
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which a truly necessary class is lacking, and also of those circum-
stances in which a necessary class is not really "necessary," but is
joined for purely strategic reasons.
B. Scope of the Necessary Class
A further issue raised by the interplay of Rules 19 and 23 is
the question of which Rule takes precedence in determining the
existence of a necessary class. Must the class be of a special type
under Rule 23(b), or does the standard in Rule 19(a) control? In
this section, the Comment argues that Rule 19(a) determines the
necessity of joining the class (regardless of how Rule 23 would cat-
egorize that class). But, of course, the class must also meet Rule
23's prerequisite and type requirements.
Briefly, for a class to be necessary for a just adjudication, it
must meet the standards of Rule 19(a). This means that, in addi-
tion to satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(a), the class must
also qualify as a Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) class. Since Rule
23(b)(3) "common question" classes are certified to permit (but
not require) the joinder of legally unrelated claims, they cannot be
necessary unless they also qualify as Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2)
classes. Rule 23(b)(1) "mandatory classes" essentially consist of
Rule 19 parties and can be necessary to an already existing bilat-
eral suit. More problematic, however, are Rule 23(b)(2) "injunctive
class actions." Nevertheless, because courts have interpreted Rule
23(b)(1) more narrowly than similar language in 19(a)(2), there will
still be some situations where Rule 23(b)(2) classes will be neces-
sary classes under Rule 19. In any event, the key requirement is
that the class qualifies as necessary under Rule 19(a). It is irrele-
vant for these purposes whether the class is a Rule 23(b)(1) class, a
Rule 23(b)(2) class, or a Rule 23(b)(3) class, so long as it is one of
these.
The Rule 23(b)(1) mandatory class action provides for certifi-
cation of a class where separate actions by the members of the
class could result in "inconsistent or varying adjudications . . .
which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class" or adjudications that would "impair or
impede" the ability of non-party class members to protect their
interests. In other words, a class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) is
simply a group of Rule 19 necessary parties, analogous to equity's
old representative suit."1 The close relationship between the neces-
91 Robinson v First National City Bank, 482 F Supp 92, 98 n 14 (S D NY 1979); FRCP
23, Advisory Committee Note (referring to FRCP 19(a)(2)(i) and (ii)).
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sary parties rule and the 23(b)(1) class is illustrated when one com-
pares the two prongs of Rule 19(a)(2) with those of Rule 23(b)(1).
Both Rules note the risk of multiple, inconsistent obligations and
the risk that an adjudication will impair the interests of absentees
as the factors to consider when deciding whether the respective
rule applies. Moreover, the Advisory Committee Notes state that
the two rules were drafted with similar interests in mind.9 2
Despite their textual similarity, the overlap between Rule
19(a)(2) and Rule 23(b)(1) may not be complete. Courts tend to
interpret the requirements of the Rule 23(b)(1) mandatory class
action in accordance with pre-1966 Rule 19 standards.9 3 Thus Rule
23(b)(1) actions often turn on whether the class members are
"united in interest" in a legal sense. This standard differs from
that of Rule 19(a) which, since 1966, also considers practical risks
when determining whether a person is a necessary party. In other
words, even if a class does not qualify as a "mandatory class"
under the technical legal standard of Rule 23(b)(1), it may still
qualify as a necessary class. To be a necessary class, however, the
group must still be certifiable under Rule 23(b)(2) (or much less
likely, under Rule 23(b)(3)), and meet the requirements of Rule
19(a) and 23(a).
A Rule 23(b)(3) "common question class action" depends on
the predominance of a common question of law or fact. It has no
analog in Rule 19. Rule 23(b)(3) evolved out of the multiplicity of
suits doctrine which allowed for class suits by groups of people who
had unrelated, but essentially identical claims.94 The goal of the
doctrine was to reduce administrative costs and to streamline liti-
gation by resolving factually similar cases in a single action. 5 Since
the "common question class action" represents an example of per-
missive joinder and depends more on considerations of conve-
nience, it is unlikely to implicate Rule 19 and require joinder un-
less the class also qualifies as a Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2)
class.
,2 Proposed Amendments, 39 FRD at 100.
See Newberg, 1 Newberg on Class Actions § 4.63 at 407 (cited in note 76) (discussing
mutuality of estoppel and similarity of new Rule 23 to the old rule), § 4.04 at 275-79 (dis-
cussing judicial efforts to limit the scope of Rule 23(b)(1)).
' See note 57 and accompanying text.
95 A class member can elect to opt out of a Rule 23(b)(3) class, but not out of a Rule
23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) class. Van Gemert v Boeing, 259 F Supp 125, 130-31 (S D NY
1966); Newberg, 1 Newberg on Class Actions § 4.20 at 311-12 (cited in note 76). See gener-
ally Chafee, Some Problems of Equity at 152 (cited in note 2).
1472 [58:1453
Compulsory Joinder
Lastly, Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive class actions are the most
problematic of the three types of class actions for purposes of this
Comment. They are class actions where the injunctive relief re-
quested would affect all the class members, as is frequently the
case in civil rights litigation. There is no analog for this provision
in Rule 19(a). However, situations in which a class is certified
under Rule 23(b)(2) may overlap with circumstances in which join-
der of a necessary party is appropriate: where the ability of the
absentees to protect their interests is impaired or where the risk of
multiple, inconsistent obligations against the defendant is appar-
ent. This does not mean, however, that an injunctive class action
must also qualify as a Rule 23(b)(1) mandatory class action to
come under Rule 19(a). As discussed above, although Rule 19(a)(2)
and the Rule 23(b)(1) class action focus on the same factors, the
standards under which those factors are examined differ.9 6 Because
the two are not wholly congruent, there may be situations in which
a class that qualifies as a Rule 23(b)(2) "injunctive class action,"
but not as a Rule 23(b)(1) "mandatory class action," may still be a
necessary party under Rule 19(a). 7
Because necessary classes are akin to defendant classes in that
both require the joinder of a large number of perhaps unwilling
litigants,98 the availability of Rule 19 to Rule 23(b)(2) classes may
also depend on whether a Rule 23(b)(2) class can be a defendant
class. If so, this is an objection to the existence of Rule 23(b)(2)
necessary classes. Several courts and commentators, citing the sig-
nificant costs and complexities associated with defendant class ac-
tions, have taken a narrow view of defendant class actions when
certified as "injunctive class actions" under Rule 23(b)(2).ss The
main objection is that the language of Rule 23(b)(2) suggests that
it is appropriate only where injunctive relief benefits the class, not
the party opposing the class. This interpretation stymies injunctive
defendant class actions, but does not pose as significant a barrier
94 See note 93 and accompanying text.
17 See Shimkus, 816 F2d at 1322 (non-African American minorities' ability to protect
interest in remedying housing discrimination is impeded and impaired by nonjoinder).
'8 See discussion of defendant classes in note 76.
See Comment, 38 UCLA L Rev at 228-34 (cited in note 20). Compare Henson v East
Lincoln Township, 814 F2d 410, 413-17 (7th Cir 1987); Thompson v Board of Education of
Romeo Community Schools, 709 F2d 1200, 1204 (6th Cir 1983) (Rule 23(b)(2) does not con-
template certification of a defendant class); Paxman v Campbell, 612 F2d 848, 854 (4th Cir
1980) (allowing certification of defendant class creates an "anomalous situation"), with
Marcera v Chinlund, 595 F2d 1231, 1238-39 (2d Cir 1979) (Rule 23(b)(2) can be used to
certify a defendant class of public officials), vacated on other grounds, Lombard v Marcera,
442 US 915 (1979).
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for necessary classes, whose interests might be protected by injunc-
tive relief.100 Necessary classes may have a stronger case, moreover,
in that without some representation in the litigation their interests
will be affected in their absence. At least in the ordinary defendant
class action the original defendant offers some protection even if
the court refuses to certify a class.
CONCLUSION
The joinder of necessary classes under Rule 19 is an important
mechanism for the protection of absent classes. Rule 19(d) does
not impede, but rather encourages, the joinder of classes where
they are necessary for a just adjudication. Section (d)'s purpose, as
illuminated by historical and policy considerations, is simply to ob-
viate the need in any class action to join all absent class members
once an adequate representative has been joined. This provision
preserves the utility of the class action as a device for convenient
and efficient adjudication. Indeed, Rule 19 is a superior mechanism
where disputes concerning several classes threaten to impair the
interests of unsophisticated groups of absentees, and may also offer
an end-run around diversity problems created by Rule 19(b).
100 See, for example, Shimkus, 816 F2d at 1322.
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